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I get your pc, “tamper” it, then i install a fake bios that tells you all is well and that your tpm and secureboot and whatever else bullcrap they invent is still happy.
A USB keylogger is not detectable by the computer, not in firmware nor operating system. It passively sniffs the traffic between the USB keyboard and the computer, to be dumped out later.
You know secure boot was specifically made to protect users for this exact use case. Any tampering of the system will prevent the system from booting.
I get your pc, “tamper” it, then i install a fake bios that tells you all is well and that your tpm and secureboot and whatever else bullcrap they invent is still happy.
See the problem?
It won’t boot though, because the keys to decrypt the system are stored in the TPM.
Sure you could replace the whole OS, but that’s going to be very obvious and won’t allow you access to the data.
If you have physical access you could go into the bios and turn off secure boot
If you enable Secure Boot you should also set a BIOS password for this very reason.
So, if you set a bios password either way, which benefit does secureboot give?
I think you can reset a bios password by taking the CMOS battery out or something?
Not sure if this works these days, but on older systems there was a reset bios config jumper and pulling the cmos battery.
Can’t access the bios with secure boot on (at least I could not on an old laptop I was refurbishing, thank god the owner could login into windows)
That’s unusual, I think. Every computer I’ve had that had it on, I was able to turn it off when I went to install Linux.
Isnt it possible to have a recovery key? Isnt that technically a backdoor? Maybe the terms are not correct but there is a way in physically.
A person with physical access can tamper with the OS, then tamper with the signing keys. Most secure boot systems allow you to install keys.
Secure boot can’t detect a USB keylogger. Nothing can.
The signature checks will immediately fail if ANY tampering has occurred.
Adding a USB keylogger that has not been signed will cause a signature verification failure during boot.
A USB keylogger is not detectable by the computer, not in firmware nor operating system. It passively sniffs the traffic between the USB keyboard and the computer, to be dumped out later.
If your keys are stored in the TPM for use during the secure boot phase, there will be nothing for it to log.